"conducted an in-depth analysis", anytime you see that phrase without detailed specifics into the analytics thereof, be wary. That said, I too believe a great deal of efforting and perhaps even numerical artifice had gone into making earnings appear to be more than the accomplishments they actually are, not least of which is the lowering of the " expectation bar " across the board.
From what I read companies have to report GAAP along side the non-GAAP financials. It is transparent as the SEC requires this.
Not an issue if analysts know both numbers. The market has full exposure to the differences. Just like QE, it is a know entity and as such people make up their own mind how to value stocks based on all these transparent issues.
"And then came McGinn. Lucent was still well enough to survive intact until Schacht picked McGinn as his successor. It was only when McGinn put Lucent under such capital and cash-flow pressure by virtue of irresponsible, reckless CLEC financial deals that it had no chance for success. These deals were not those of marketing subordinates far down the food chain. These were deals that by their very structure required approval at the top, and across multiple areas. Indicative of the mess was the fact that there was no inside executive left standing to run the company after McGinn. Schacht had to step back in as a caretaker. He was always an outsider, never an insider. Carly Fiorina, another big part of the problem, had already bailed. Pat Russo had bailed to Kodak and failed as a “turnaround specialist”. And she was the only executive acceptable and willing to take the helm. By far, the worst executives were the last: The blind leading the blind, or the incompetent not knowing any better than to pick the incompetent as subordinates. If there were criteria for selecting people for executive positions within the company, it had nothing to do with competence. But there’s more to the last batch of executives than incompetence. Not only did they not know they were incompetent, they did not realize that what they were doing was reckless, dangerous, and questionably fraudulent. While some might not consider it fraudulent, it did not require any special genius to sense that the performance the top executives were requiring could only be accomplished with marginal, highly risky deals and cooking the books to the max.
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