I guess in your obsession with Bush bashing, you haven't noticed that the democratization of Iraq has begun. In case you are unclear what the definition of a Democracy is, I will provide one for you here (from dictionary.com): Democracy - 1. government by the people; a form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system. Translation: Majority rules.
And since you have no hope for the future of the Middle East, here's another article for you to consider:
Saudi Arabia's model for peace in Iraq
By DAVID IGNATIUS, Washington Post columnist
24 November 2006
Copyright 2006, Akron Beacon Journal. All rights reserved.
WASHINGTON
While the nation debates what to do about the disaster in Iraq, I have been pondering a disaster that hasn't happened -- in Saudi Arabia.
There are some lessons in Saudi Arabia that may clarify administration choices as it nears crunch time in the region.
Ten years ago, Osama bin Laden declared war on America to ``expel the infidels from the Arab peninsula.' One theme of his 1996 fatwa was that for all its military power, America was weak. It fled from terrorist attacks in Beirut, Aden and Somalia, and would flee Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden said of his terrorist cadres: ``These youths love death even as you love life.'
The truth of his words grew clear on 9/11, when 15 Saudi-born terrorists attacked symbols of U.S. power. In ways, al-Qaeda's game plan has worked: The botched occupation of Iraq triggered a ferocious reaction there, and the American public is losing patience with the war, as bin Laden would predict.
Given these setbacks for America, it's easy to forget that bin Laden has failed utterly in his goal of toppling the ruling monarchy in his home, Saudi Arabia. The oil kingdom, the real prize, is stronger and more secure than it was five years ago.
Saudi Arabia is not exactly a rock of stability, but its gains are highlighted in a study by Nawaf Obaid, a clear-headed Saudi analyst who advises his government. He notes that since May 2003, Saudi security forces have foiled 25 major terrorist attacks, have captured or killed 264 al-Qaeda operatives and arrested 845 people with links to al-Qaeda. Of 26 terrorists on the Saudi most-wanted list, all but one have been captured or killed.
Perhaps more important, the Saudis have begun to crack the network of religious extremists that gave al-Qaeda a platform. The Saudi interior ministry, once a hidden source of support for jihadists, now oversees what Obaid calls an ``ideological re-education program' run by religious scholars and professors. More than 400 people have been released from this program, Obaid says.
The mysterious Saud clan that rules the kingdom is steering a steadier course under King Abdullah. Almost unnoticed last month, the Saudis announced a council to oversee the transition to the next generation of leaders.
As with many aspects of Saudi rule, details are murky. But the plan appears to provide a stable legal framework for selecting a successor to the current king and crown prince -- easing the danger of a future political crisis.
What are the lessons in Saudi Arabia's move back from the brink of potential disaster? The most important is that the Saudis decided to take charge of their own security, rather than relying on an America that many Saudis resented. After 2003, Saudis realized they faced a deadly terrorist threat and began to fight it aggressively. They focused on national solutions, reduced the visible, humiliating presence of U.S. troops, pursued political reforms and increased oil production.
How does this apply to Iraq? Like the Saudis, Iraqis will have to save themselves, working within the authentic political framework of their culture, religion and region. The more we try to substitute our will for theirs, with more troops or exhortation, the more we enfeeble them. As in Saudi Arabia, we must move slowly but deliberately out of the spotlight, into the shadows with a sustainable mission of training and advising Iraqi troops.
What will contain an Iraqi civil war, in the end, is that none of the regional powers can tolerate a shattered Iraq -- not Iran, not Syria, not Saudi Arabia, not Jordan, not Turkey. Neither do most Iraqis want a dissolution of their unitary state. Iraqis will restabilize their nation when the ``nationalist forces' -- including ones we don't like, the Mahdi army and Sunni insurgents -- find common cause under a regional mandate.
Only America can broker the regional conference that will allow a political transition in Iraq. That's our leverage now -- diplomatic clout, more than military power. If the neighboring powers can help apply a tourniquet to stop the bleeding in Iraq, America can begin to step away.
Ignatius is a Washington Post columnist.
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