Did anyone at the court house find the message in the bottle that DUFUS pretend to file?
Boss
Re: THURSDAY JULY 31ST, 2008
« Reply #560 on: Today at 09:52:47 PM » Quote
________________________________________
Georgia Court House Playing Games with Fed-Ex
7:38 AM
On FedEx vehicle for delivery
ATLANTA, GA
10:28 AM
Delivery exception
ATLANTA, GA
Customer not available or business closed
Jul 31, 2008 2:25 PM
At local FedEx facility
ATLANTA, GA
A filing was sent to The Clerk of the Court for Cooper, Looks like a deposition of a Fed-Ex delivery person will now also be in the works!!!
Oh the tangled Webb's we weave!!!
This is what was sent!!! Just so you know!!!!!
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE July 21st ORDER AND MOTION TO VACATE THE JULY 21ST ORDER ENTERED BY THIS COURT
COMES NOW the Defendant, RUFUS PAUL HARRIS, a/k/a
PAUL RUFUS HARRIS and Moves this Court to reconsider
the ruling and resulting Order entered on July 21st 2008
and to further vacate said Order entered to correct a
clear error of law and to prevent manifest injustice to
the Defendants in this cause and in support thereof states:
I. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
The same arguments in this Motion for Reconsideration
are the same that existed in the original motion to set
aside the default in this cause and have never been
adequately even mentioned in the July 21st 2008 order.
Fact # 1: The default was improperly entered by the
Clerk and not by this Court.
Fact # 2: There was no Default Judgment entered by this
Court, only a Default by the Clerk.
Fact # 3: No discovery was furnished by the Plaintiff prior
to the improper default being entered by the clerk.
Prior to the default being entered by the Clerk, the
Defendant, RUFUS PAUL HARRIS, a/k/a PAUL RUFUS HARRIS,
appeared and answered the Plaintiff’s Complaint by
appearing personally before this Court on October 25, 2006
and submitted documents, which were accepted by this Court
under seal, as a defense to Plaintiff’s Complaint.
On the October 30, 2006 the Defendant entered into a
stipulation with the Plaintiff to allow the entry of a
Temporary Restraining Order against the Defendants, further
proof that an appearance had been made and the default
entered by the Clerk was premature and improper, another
clear error of law and manifest injustice imposed upon this
Defendant.
These appearance by this Defendant and submission of
exculpatory evidence precluded the default being
entered by the Clerk under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and should have required a hearing
before this Court on a motion for default.
This clear error of law and manifest injustice to this
Defendant has not adequately been addressed by this
Court and was not addressed by this Court’s July
21, 2008 Order either. The July 21st Order totally
ignores the fact that this Defendant answered by
appearing and submitting evidence in his defense. The
Default, as entered, should have been set aside as being
improperly entered and not doing so by this Court is a
clear error of law.
Courts take an expansive view toward the definition of
appearance, which would have precluded a default
being entered by the Clerk, often finding it when a
party shows an intent to defend and even holding
settlement conferences are sufficient to create an
appearance under the Federal Rules. Muniz v Vidal,739
F2d 699 (5th Cir 1984).
Strong authority requires Courts to look beyond normal
actions to evaluate appearance.
In Lutomski v Panther Valley Coin Exchange, 653 F2d
270, 271 (6th Cir 1981) the Court held that even though
that Defendant made no formal appearance and filed no
papers, the Court was required to look beyond the
presence of such formal actions to examine other
evidence of active representation. Rufus Paul Harris
made an appearance before this Court, filed documents
with the Court in his defense, entered into a
stipulation with the Plaintiff and was in settlement
negotiations with the Plaintiff, all prior to the
unauthorized default by the Clerk. A clear error of law
was committed by not setting aside the improper default
in the first place and then by not granting the Defendant's
motion for reconsideration
II. MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
In its July 21 2008 Order, this Court seems to find
that all of the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint
are well founded and deemed admitted because of the
Clerk's default which was improperly entered, while
totally disregarding the defensive evidence submitted
to and accepted by this Court on October 30, 2006, all
as set forth hereinabove..
III. MOTION TO COMPEL
This Court has erred as a matter of law by completely
disregarding the requirements of Rule 26 F.R.C.P. as
argued by this Defendant.
Rule 26 was not designed to allow the Plaintiff to
delay or refuse to furnish discovery pursuant to said
Rule 26 until a default is entered and then claim that
since a default has been entered they don't have to comply
anymore. The discovery requirement does not begin and end
at the entry of a default, properly or improperly entered,
it begins at the moment the Defendant is served with the
lawsuit, to rule otherwise, as this Court has done, is a
clear error of law and a manifest injustice upon this
Defendant.
The Plaintiff possessed exculpatory evidence, as did this
Court, and refused to furnish it to the Plaintiff to
prepare his answer and defense. It was an error of law and
a manifest injustice to the Defendant to deny access to
evidence held by the Plaintiff. In fact, anything supplied
to the Defendant by the Plaintiff would have had to be
considered newly discovered evidence and would have
satisfied an additional condition of a motion for
consideration.
It is very evident by Rule 26 and the U.S. Constitution 14Th
Amendment that the government counsel must furnish to the
defense information which is exculpatory and impeaching of
government witnesses and evidence as those terms are
defined in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963) and
Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150 (1972). And See
United States v. McVeigh, 923 F. Supp. 1310, 1313 (D. Colo.
1996). In the April 29, 1996 Order (D.E. 1310), the
district court stayed its hand in issuing a direct order
compelling disclosure of information based upon the
representations of government counsel. However, the
district court's reliance upon the government's
representations presupposed that the government counsel
understands their duty pursuant to Brady and Rule 26 and
that they have the means and authority to perform that
duty. Neither of these presuppositions have proven true
with the SEC Counsels handling of this case. To date the
Defendant have been provided no discovery rights or
received any cooperation from the plaintiff in the form of
evidentiary disclosure.
WHEREFORE, THE Defendant, RUFUS PAUL HARRIS, a/k/a PAUL
RUFUS HARRIS, MOVES THIS Court to reconsider and
vacate the Order that was entered by this Court on July
21st 2008 for the foregoing reasons and allow this
Defendant to properly defend against Plaintiff’s Complaint.
You know these people make me sick to my stomach!!! Which is their goal!!!
Dear Lord, may they feel the complete and utter power of your raft. AMEN
It is Time, Let His Will be done!!!
Exodus 9
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