It is likely that BDCO management and advisors have considered much of this already.
Oversimplified, the RCN and other interrelated valuation methodologies for a refining operation lead to some interesting conclusions.
In the case of a topping unit, particularly a unit that can digest high API, low sulphur sweet feedstock, there is some inherent value - you can see that in the Valero activity.
The sunk cost/investment in the Nixon unit has value - the assets, operations knowledge, and location might all combine into something positive, if there were a regional refiner who needed to increase throughput, or adjust for light sweet crude to augment existing front-end capability that was tuned for heavy or sour crude.
If there is pipeline infrastructure nearby, or rail infrastructure to use the Nixon unit intermediate to feed a downstream system, there might be something to salvage. Knocking out transportation-related margin hits might be a key.
Adjusting operations to minimize down-time is another opportunity for an acquirer/partner - some things, like making the electrical mains infrastructure more resilient, to reduce downtime is relatively inexpensive, and increases in uptime, reduce repeated shutdown/startup hysteresis that impact margin.
It looks like Nixon may have stabilization capability, and was apparently supplying contract jet fuel from kerosene conversion - that is a positive. It lacks a required de-sulphuring capability for transportation-grade diesel, which is likely to expensive to add under current circumstances.
The drilling fluids thing is a quirk - that might be regional. Hydrocarbon-based fluids for well-bore control are specialty. I don't know enough about the regional issues to comment. That seems to have been part of the Nixon unit output.
A regional refiner would be the best bet, if there is one who needs light crude feedstock.
